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INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF NAVIES AND COAST GUARDS IN
MARITIME SECURITY

A
D
W
I

s a concept maritime security may encompass, and blur demarcations
between, a range of traditional threats (military or strategic) and threats from
non-traditional actors. 1 Threats to national security in the maritime domain
may include “terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime . . . piracy, environmental/resource destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.”2 The challenge that follows is that navies across the globe are increasingly called upon to carry our maritime security and even law enforcement
roles going beyond traditional warfighting capabilities. 3 Indeed, as Till has
noted, as the concept of maritime security widens, “the extent of potential
overlap” between naval and coast guard activities “is increasing in ways
which raise issues over who should be responsible for what.” 4 Thus, in an
age of maritime security, actionable law enforcement intelligence is no longer
an issue for coast guards alone; it is increasingly an issue for navies as well.
There are a number of obvious virtues in maintaining distinct naval and
coast guard forces: pragmatically, “lawships” need different tools and capabilities than warships, and conventional “gray painted” naval vessels are
sometimes ill-suited to perform law enforcement tasks. 5 This is most apparent in the standards applied to the use of force in differing operations. In
general, the military is entitled to use deadly force to overcome “the enemy,”
but police forces do not have “enemies” and are generally required to remain

1. Christian Bueger, What is Maritime Security? 53 MARINE POLICY 159 (2015); Dirk C. Sonnenberg, Maritime Law Enforcement: A Critical Capability for the Navy? 1–3 (Mar. 2012)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle
/10945/6873.
2. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD, NAVAL OPERATIONS
CONCEPT 2010: I MPLEMENTING THE MARITIME STRATEGY 35 (2010), https://www.uscg
.mil/history/docs/2010NOC.pdf.
3. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 5.
4. GEOFFREY TILL, SEAPOWER: A GUIDE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 302 (2004).
5. Sam Bateman, Regional Navies and Coast Guards: Striking a Balance between “Lawships” and
Warships, in NAVAL MODERNISATION IN SOUTH-E AST ASIA: NATURE, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 245, 246–47 (Geoffrey Till & Jane Chan eds., 2014); see also Andrew Murdoch
& Douglas Guilfoyle, Capture and Disruption Operations: The Use of Force in Counter-Piracy off
Somalia, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 147, 167–68 (Douglas
Guilfoyle ed., 2013).
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within the bounds of reasonable and proportionate force in subduing suspects who are often fellow citizens. 6 There is also a difference in mindset
between military and law enforcement operations, with the former typically
prioritizing “disrupting or stopping the threat . . . over long-term solutions,
and intelligence exploitation . . . over evidence collection and [creating] case
packages.”7
However, not every coastal State has the luxury of maintaining separate
maritime services. 8 Even in the United States where there is a policy division
between maritime defense and security issues (with the Department of Defense and Coast Guard as the respective lead agencies) there are areas of
overlap in which certain maritime threats can be classified as both homeland
defense and national security issues. This overlap may create policy challenges. 9 While the United States is perhaps unique in the impediments of law
and tradition that restrict the use of naval assets in law enforcement operations, 10 there are nonetheless practical limitations that may restrict the effectiveness of, for example, European navies in conducting constabulary tasks. 11
In reality, most successful maritime law enforcement operations, irrespective
of the force conducting them, require both a combination of actionable intelligence and interagency (or international) cooperation based on some degree of intelligence sharing. 12
The need for intelligence is also a consequence of limited resources. Effective maritime law enforcement requires choices to be made about the deployment of finite assets. Even when maritime patrols are conducted in order to “randomly” intercept crimes such as human or drug smuggling, where
such patrols occur is itself based on intelligence. Even the most well-resourced navies and coast guards cannot maintain a “cordon of steel” around
a national coastline. There is the now well-known story of a U.S. Secretary
of State, startled at the arrival of 220 maritime irregular migrants in Miami,
6. Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act,
88 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1795, 1821 (2010); see also Håkan Friman & Jens Lindborg, Initiating
Criminal Proceedings with Military Force: Some Legal Aspects of Policing Somali Pirates by Navies , in
MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 172.
7. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 70.
8. Nong Hong, China’s Newly Formed Coast Guard and Its Implication for Regional Maritime Disputes, 28 OCEAN Y EARBOOK 611, 618 (2014).
9. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 4.
10. Id.
11. Friman & Lindborg, supra note 6; Douglas Guilfoyle, Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and
Human Rights, 59 I NTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 141 (2010).
12. Sonnenberg supra note 1, at 52.
300

Maritime Law Enforcement Operations and Intelligence

Vol. 93

demanding to know: “How in the world did they get through?” The answer
from the U.S. Coast Guard Commandant was, of course: “Sir, with all due
respect, how did they get through what?”13 In intercepting threats in the maritime domain, intelligence will always be crucial whether the mission is one
of national defense or of law enforcement.
II.

LAW E NFORCEMENT O PERATIONS AND ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

A. Maritime Domain Awareness as a Form of Intelligence
The first step in considering the role of intelligence in maritime security law
enforcement operations is, obviously enough, to consider what is meant by
intelligence. Here, Colby’s observations remain helpful:
There are no limits to the types and sources of information which may be
useful. The processing of intelligence refers to the treatment accorded the
raw data which has been collected. It generally includes appraisal of the
relevance of the information, as well as editing and cataloguing in forms
useful to decision-makers. These tasks vary enormously in complexity, depending in large measure on the amount and quality of data requested and
actually collected.14

One topic considered in passing in this article will be the sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However,
while such information may—and sometimes does—play a role in real cases
where maritime law enforcement action is taken, it is obviously not the only
or even necessarily the best source of actionable intelligence in maritime law
enforcement. A critical concept remains maritime domain awareness
(MDA). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) definition of MDA
is “[t]he effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime

13. Joseph L. Nimmich & Dana A. Goward, Maritime Domain Awareness: The Key to Maritime
Security, in GLOBAL LEGAL CHALLENGES: COMMAND OF THE COMMONS, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND NATURAL DISASTERS 57 (Michael D. Carsten ed., 2007).
14. Jonathan E. Colby, The Developing International Law on Gathering and Sharing Security Intelligence, 1 Y ALE STUDIES IN W ORLD PUBLIC ORDER 49, 53 (1974) (quoted in NATALIE KLEIN,
MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 211 (2012)).
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environment that could impact upon . . . security, safety, economy or [the]
environment.”15
This definition appears to draw heavily on the wording of the 2004 U.S.
Maritime Security Policy directive.16 While MDA is originally a U.S. concept,
Australia, Canada, the European Union and the Philippines (among others)
all have MDA policies. 17 MDA is basically about knowing who is doing what,
where. A simple example is provided by Seychelles efforts to secure their
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (formidably large compared to their land
territory) against piracy. By fitting all Seychellois fishing vessels with automatic identification systems, and improving radar coverage across their
EEZ, the Seychellois Coast Guard was able to identify vessels in its EEZ
that were not Seychellois fishing vessels and send one of its limited number
of cutters to investigate and verify that the vessel was not a threat. 18 However, MDA is not always this simple. 19
B. Intelligence Sharing: Problems of National Law and Agency Coordination
In the U.S. context, various impediments have made the sharing of information gathered by military or intelligence agencies with law enforcement
especially challenging. Nonetheless, the basic problems relating to the use of
intelligence agency products in law enforcement are relatively common to a
number of jurisdictions. As Vervaele notes:

15. International Maritime Organization, MSC.1/Circ. 1415, Amendments to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual 11 (May 25, 2012),
http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/msnote/pdf/msin1242anx1.pdf.
16. President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13, at 5 (Dec. 21, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf.
17. See Transport Canada, Maritime Domain Awareness, CANADA.CA, http://www.tc.gc.ca/
eng/marinesecurity/initiatives-235.htm (last visited July 19, 2017); Commission Communication, Towards the Integration of Maritime Surveillance: A Common Information Sharing Environment for
the EU Maritime Domain, COM (2009) 538 final (Oct. 15, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0538&from=EN; ANGEL RABASA &
PETER CHALK, NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS IN
THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE COAST W ATCH SYSTEM OF THE PHILIPPINES 21 (2012). Australia is discussed below.
18. The author observed this system on a visit to the Seychelles Coast Guard headquarters
in 2011.
19. See infra Part III.
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That such information can be used as a lead for initiating criminal investigations is hardly contested. Much more of a problem is, however, whether
this information per se is able to give rise to reasonable suspicion or form
a sufficient basis for the use of coercive measures under criminal law . . .
[or] can be used as legal proof in criminal proceedings.20

There is also the risk that if law enforcement agencies are allowed routinely to use information derived from intelligence agency surveillance (usually conducted under more permissive standards than those required of law
enforcement) a situation may evolve where ordinary restraints on law enforcement surveillance are circumvented through surveillance activities being de facto “outsourced” to intelligence agencies. 21 U.S. discussion of this
question has centered on the role of intelligence gathered under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA prohibited direct sharing of intelligence gathered under the Act with law enforcement agencies, and required—in addition to certain statutory requirements—the permission of the
Attorney General for such sharing to take place in a particular case. 22 The
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 substantially reformed the law concerning information sharing between defense, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to facilitate, inter alia, efforts to combat crimes of terrorism. The principal reform was a change to FISA introduced by section 218 of the Act, under
which FISA investigatory powers could be used if “a significant purpose” of
surveillance was the collection of foreign intelligence information (as opposed to the previous standard of “primary purpose”). 23 This change was
intended to more readily allow, for example, a wiretap to proceed not only
if the purposes of intercepts was to “turn a suspected spy into a double agent
(a classic counterespionage technique), but also to prosecute that spy for espionage (the textbook law enforcement move).”24
While changes to FISA may have loosened some rules-based restrictions
around interagency intelligence sharing, they have not necessarily removed

20. John A. E. Vervaele, Terrorism and Information Sharing between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities in the US and the Netherlands: Emergency Criminal Law?, 1 UTRECHT LAW REVIEW 1, 2 (2005).
21. Sales, supra note 6, at 1810–11.
22. Vervaele, supra note 20, at 6–7; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 §§ 106, 305
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806, 1825 (2012)).
23. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272 (1971) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2012)).
24. Sales, supra note 6, at 1812.
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all possible firewalls. Principal remaining barriers include the National Security Act 1947, which continues to place a broad and ambiguously worded
prohibition on the Central Intelligence Agency’s exercising any “police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions,”25 and especially the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which makes it an offense for
anyone to use “any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws” of the United States (except as otherwise
authorized by the Constitution or statute). 26 As a matter of policy, the general
prohibition on law execution by military forces has been extended to the
U.S. Navy, despite an express textual reference authorizing these activities in
the Act. 27 As Sales notes, “it remains unclear to what extent Posse Comitatus
allows law enforcement officials and military officers to share information
with one another. Indeed, in part because of the Act, military brass appear
to be exceedingly reluctant to share information with their colleagues in law
enforcement agencies.”28
While these are obviously U.S.-specific problems, they highlight the kind
of difficulties that may and do exist in other jurisdictions, as well as where
multiple government agencies have had traditionally distinct functions and
legislative mandates, but that are now expected to cooperate to deliver
greater maritime security. In Australia, for example, it was once estimated
that, in addition to responsibility “for securing Australia’s maritime approaches [being] spread widely between agencies of both [the federal Commonwealth government and the states],” that “about twelve Commonwealth
agencies” have some involvement in questions of maritime security. 29 While
the creation of the Australian Border Force (ABF) in 2015 might be thought
to have simplified the situation (Australia’s border being entirely maritime),
the ABF notes that it “regularly engages with partner agencies,”30 including
the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Antarctic Division, the
Australian Communications and Media Authority, the Australian Crime
25. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-523, § 102 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 3036(d)(1) (2012)).
26. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).
27. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD Dir. 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials ¶ E4.3 (1986).
28. Sales, supra note 6, at 1824.
29. Sam Bateman, Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches, 3 SECURITY CHALLENGES 109,
117 (2007).
30. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF I MMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, AUSTRALIAN BORDER FORCE, PROTECTING OUR BORDERS, https://www.border.gov.au/australian-border-force-ab f/protecting (last visited July 19, 2017).
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Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Transaction Reports and
Analysis Centre, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Industry and Science, the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Office of
Transport Security, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the
Department of Environment and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority. The use of the word “including” to introduce a non-exhaustive list
of eighteen partner agencies is telling as to the complexities involved.
This type and level of complexity resulted in the U.S. adoption in 2005
of the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan to better coordinate the interagency response to particular maritime security operations. 31
Since that time, “the MOTR Plan has been successfully employed for hundreds of routine maritime threats and a number of low-frequency/high risk
threats. These cases include drug and migrant interdiction, fisheries violations, bomb threats, radiation/nuclear alarm resolution, and piracy.” 32 At
least ten States have similarly adopted “whole-of-government processes to
improve the interagency response to [maritime] threats” to deal with such
challenges of information sharing and coordinated action. 33
III.

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

While MDA is a simple enough concept, delivering it in a manner consistent
with international law is not free from difficulty. First, there may be questions regarding the intelligence uses to which information gathered in maritime law enforcement operations may be put. Second, States may desire information about vessels transiting off their coasts that they have no obvious
31. Brian Wilson, Reshaping Maritime Security Cooperation: The Importance of Interagency Coordination at the National Level, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra
note 5, at 202.
32. Gary L. Tomasulo Jr., Evolution of Interagency Cooperation in the United States Government: The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan 3 (June 2010) (unpublished
M.B.A. thesis, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/59157/659552377-MIT.pdf?sequence=2.
33. Brian Wilson, Five Maritime Security Developments That Will Resonate for a Generation, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY J OURNAL (Mar. 11, 2015), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Wilson-NSJ-Article-PDF.pdf.
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power to demand under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) absent further international cooperative mechanisms being established. 34 As a key example of the latter, in 2004 Australia declared its intention to create a 1,000 nautical mile (nm) “Maritime Information Zone”
within which it proposed that any passing vessel would be “required to provide details of cargo, destination, crew, port of call, [and] likely arrival [time]
at port.”35 The Australian Prime Minister was further reported as saying the
Defence Force “will be able to intercept and board ships and do ‘whatever
it takes’ to get the information they need.”36 Though clearly able to make the
provision of such information a condition of entry for vessels intending to
enter an Australian port, 37 Australia had no obvious authority to demand
such information from vessels merely transiting within 1,000 nm, let alone
intercept them using defense personnel to demand information. In addition,
the Australian government declared an intention “to identify all vessels,
other than day recreational boats” upon their entry to its EEZ. 38 Within
months protests from Indonesia and New Zealand saw Australia rebrand its
initiative the “Australian Maritime Information System” and stress that information would be sought from shipping on “a wholly voluntary basis” underpinned by “cooperative international arrangements.”39
Unsurprisingly, Australia was already actively involved in efforts to establish a cooperative international system for greater exchange of shipping
information at the IMO. 40 In 2006 after four years of work, and in an initiative largely spearheaded by the United States and the United Kingdom, the
IMO Maritime Safety Committee reached agreement on a long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) system, to be implemented as Regulation 191 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Its
34. The following section draws substantially on research previously published. See Douglas
Guilfoyle, Maritime Security, in LAW OF THE SEA: UNCLOS AS A LIVING TREATY 329 (Jill
Barrett & Richard Barnes eds., 2016).
35. Catherine McGrath, Government Boosts Maritime Security, ABC (Dec. 15, 2004), http://
www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1266082.htm .
36. Id.
37. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 25(2), opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
38. Natalie Klein, Legal Implications of Australia’s Maritime Identification System, 55 I NTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 337, 337 (2006) (quoting Press Release,
Prime Minister John Howard, Strengthening Offshore Maritime Security (Dec. 14, 2004)).
39. NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 227 (2012).
40. See, e.g., Australia, MSC 79/5/12, Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Long-Range
Identification and Tracking of Ships (Sept. 24, 2004), http://merchantmarine.financelaw
.fju.edu.tw/data/IMO/MSC/79/MSC%2079-5-12.pdf.
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implementation under SOLAS obviously has the effect of making it binding
on SOLAS State parties through the tacit acceptance procedure. 41 The regulation entered into force in July 2009. The LRIT system’s essential features
are as follows:





[V]essels covered by the regulation must automatically transmit every six
hours the ship’s identity, position (expressed in latitude and longitude)
and “the date and time of the position provided;”42
all covered vessels “must transmit . . . LRIT data to the data centre nominated by its flag State” and the LRIT regulations “allow flag States to
receive LRIT information from ships flying their flag” wherever they are
worldwide43 and
contracting SOLAS governments must “elect either to create a National
LRIT Data Centre, or participate in a Regional or Cooperative [LRIT]
Data Centre.”44

LRIT Data Centres may request information of each other through the
International Data Exchange. Using this mechanism, port States are “entitled to receive [LRIT] information about ships which have indicated their
intention to enter a port facility . . . or a place under the jurisdiction of that
[State], irrespective of where such ships [are] . . . provided they are not located” within another SOLAS party’s internal waters. 45 Correspondingly, a
coastal State is “entitled to receive [LRIT] information about ships . . . navigating within . . . 1,000 nautical miles of its coast provided such ships are not
located” within another SOLAS party’s internal waters. 46
Thus, despite the skepticism with which the Australian Maritime Information Zone proposal was initially received, the final LRIT system strongly
resembles what Australia had proposed. Nor was Australia alone in seeking

41. J AMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
I NTERNATIONAL LAW 161–62 (2011).
42. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 5.3, Nov. 1,
1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 (2007 revision) [hereinafter SOLAS].
43. Chris Rahman, Maritime Domain Awareness in Australia and New Zealand, in MARITIME
SECURITY: I NTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW
Z EALAND 200, 211 (Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop & Donald R Rothwell eds., 2010).
44. Id. at 210.
45. SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 8.1.
46. Id.
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information about vessels transiting waters off its coasts. During IMO negotiations in 2005, the United States suggested coastal States should be able
to request LRIT information about vessels within 2,000 nm of their coasts. 47
The following year, Norway suggested 1,200 nm. 48
Nor is the LRIT system effective only on paper. After some delays in its
establishment (during which time the United States provided International
Data Exchange services on an interim basis), the UN Secretary-General announced in 2012 that
the International Data Exchange for the [LRIT] system is now in operation. As at [sic] 9 March 2012, 97 out of 161 parties to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea were part of the system and 66
data centres for long-range identification and tracking of ships were connected to the Exchange.49

Nonetheless, as an MDA tool the LRIT system is far from perfect. It contains rather “pedantic” restrictions on the ability to request information
about ships present within another State party’s baselines. 50 More problematically, it permits flag States to opt out entirely from providing information
where requests are made on security grounds. 51 Another weakness of the
system is that it applies only to passenger ships, cargo ships of at least 300
gross tons and mobile offshore drilling units. 52 It therefore does not apply to
cargo ships under 300 tons nor to fishing vessels or small privately-owned
recreational craft. It is precisely such small vessels that pose the greater security threat: “While safety, security, and stewardship regimes are increasingly being developed for larger vessels on the sea, many smaller vessels,

47. United States, MSC 80/3/3, Long-range Identification and Tracking of Ships ¶ 5.3 (Nov.
12, 2004).
48. Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 81/25, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on
its Eighty-First Session ¶ 5.84 (May 24, 2006). Note, however, the opposition of China to
such information being sought of vessels not intending to call at a State’s port. See Maritime
Safety Committee, MSC 81/25/Add.2, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its
Eighty-First Session annex 43 (June 1, 2006).
49. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/67/79/Add.1
(Aug. 31, 2012).
50. Rahman, supra note 43, at 211 (referring to SOLAS Regulation 19-1, ¶ 8.1.2); see also
SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 8.1.4 (flag States need not provide information
about their own flag vessels present in their own territorial sea).
51. SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 9.1; see also K LEIN, supra note 39, at 232.
52. SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 2.1.
308

Maritime Law Enforcement Operations and Intelligence

Vol. 93

including most fishing vessels, tugs, and recreational vessels, are not covered
by these regimes and remain largely anonymous.”53
As the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has noted, “Small vessels
are . . . readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive
Devices (WBIEDs).”54 Further, the scale of the challenge posed by small
boats is immense, as the United States alone has “nearly 13 million registered
. . . recreational vessels, 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial
small vessels.”55 LRIT information will thus be of no use in relation to the
frequent use of small boats for smuggling (especially of drugs and migrants)56
and the increasing use of fishing vessels in transnational organized criminal
activity. 57 Terrorist organizations may also use small boats in attacks on land
targets, as was the case for some of the terrorists involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 58

53. COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, THE U.S. COAST GUARD
STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP 26 (2007), http://
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470382.
54. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY, at i
(2008), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=485572.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING I NTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
91, 194–95, 212 (2007).
57. See generally E VE DE CONING, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE FISHING I NDUSTRY (2011), http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/2011/issue-paper-transnational-organizedcrime-in-the-fishing-industry.html.
58. Somini Sengupta & Keith Bradsher, Mumbai Terrorist Siege Over, India Says, NEW Y ORK
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29mumbai.
html.
309

International Law Studies

IV.

2017

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (VBSS) O PERATIONS

A. VBSS Operations on the High Seas
Useful law enforcement intelligence can be gathered in the course of a VBSS
operation. 59 In particular, boarding a vessel suspected of one crime may reveal evidence of another crime. Thus, it was not uncommon for counterpiracy patrols off Somalia during VBSS operations to find that hidden below
decks aboard suspect vessels was not a crew of pirates, but a human cargo
of irregular migrants seeking to be smuggled into Yemen. 60 The frustrating
result was that migrant smugglers were often let go because the counterpiracy missions lacked a mandate to deal with migrant smuggling off the African coast, even though some of the same navies were engaged in interdicting migrant smugglers in the Mediterranean. 61
While this was ultimately a problem of mandate, not legal authority, it
does raise the broader question of whether there are distinct legal limitations
on what naval forces and maritime agencies can do with information gathered in the course of VBSS operations. Unsurprisingly, the issue turns on the
zone in which one operates. The high seas are for present purposes the most
pertinent case (though other zones are discussed briefly below).
In respect of the high seas, a controversy is provided by the extent of
authority conferred under UNCLOS Article 110, which governs the conduct
of VBSS operations in cases of reasonable suspicion that a vessel is engaged
in piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting or is without nationality.
Such an operation is intended to be conducted in sequence. Under Article
110(3), a warship may “send a boat under the command of an officer to the
suspected ship.” The boarding party is to first inspect the ship’s documents
59. For a very useful general overview of the law applicable to VBSS operations, see James
Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure,
16 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW J OURNAL 1 (2011), http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol16/iss1/2.
60. See also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN E ASTERN AFRICA: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 3–4, 11–15 (2013),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf; I NTERNATIONAL E XPERT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST, PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT 22 (2008), http://www.imcsnet.org
/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf.
61. European Union Naval Force: Mediterranean Operation Sophia, EEAS (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en_0.pdf.
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to “verify the ship’s right to fly its flag.” Then, “[i]f suspicion remains . . . it
may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be
carried out with all possible consideration.” The question that arises is
whether the information found in the course of such an “examination” is
limited by the original purposes of the boarding. I shall call this question the
“wider use” problem.
The conventional view is that at least some forms of wider use are prohibited. 62 The foundational text relied upon to posit this view is normally the
commentaries of the International Law Commission to the 1956 draft Articles on the Law of the Sea. With regard to the equivalent provision to Article
110, the Commission stated:
If the examination of the merchant ship’s papers does not allay the suspicions [giving rise to the rights of boarding], a further examination may be
made on board the ship. Such examination must in no circumstances be
used for purposes other than those which warranted stopping the vessel. Hence the
boarding party must be under the command of an officer responsible for
the conduct of his men. 63

The same point is made in the highly regarded Virginia Commentary,
which tracks closely to the language used by the Commission:
If suspicion remains after examination of the ship’s papers, the boarding
party may proceed to a further examination on board the ship. Such further
examination is not to be used for purposes other than those which warranted stopping the ship, and is to be carried out with all possible consideration.64

Given that international lawyers normally take the pronouncements of
the International Law Commission as authoritative, how is this limitation to
be construed? Wendel suggests a potentially broad construction. 65 Consider

62. See infra notes 63 and 64.
63. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly , 11 UN GAOR Supp. No.
9, at 284, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l. L. Comm’n. 284 (commentary to Article 46) (emphasis added).
64. 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
245 (Myron H. Nordquist, Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995).
65. PHILIPP W ENDEL, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR I NTERFERENCES WITH THE FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION IN PUBLIC I NTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2007).
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the interception of a vessel that displayed no flag or identifying markings. 66
These facts could justify boarding and inspection on grounds of suspected
statelessness. Wendel argues, however, that the right to verify nationality in
such cases cannot justify inspection of the hold or cargo, as the only relevant
material will be the vessel’s papers. 67 If the papers resolve the issue, no further search should occur. This, in Wendel’s view, raises questions regarding
the legality of continuing to conduct a search of the hold in cases such as the
So San incident in which a vessel suspected of conveying Scud missiles from
North Korea to Yemen bore no external markings of nationality, but attempted to claim Cambodian nationality verbally.68 Setting aside the fact that
the So San interdiction occurred with the consent of the ostensible flag State
(which had authority under international law to authorize the search), 69 Wendel’s general point is not unfair. We must return, however, to the text of
Article 110(2), which states that “[i]f suspicion remains after the documents
have been checked, [the boarding State] may proceed to a further examination.”70 The right of “further examination” appears to be a general one. Even
if narrowly construed by reference to the original suspicion, as Wendel would
have it, where inadequate papers have been presented and the relevant suspicion is one of statelessness, inspection of the hold may reveal information
such as a main beam number capable of assisting in the vessel’s identification. 71
To some, however, all of this is beside the point. The question at hand
is not whether a VBSS operation can be conducted on a pretext (i.e., statelessness) in order to conduct a search with an ulterior motive. This would be
open to an allegation of abuse of right (UNCLOS Article 300). Rather, the
question is what can one do with information uncovered in the course of a
legitimate VBSS operation that might be generally relevant to broader questions of maritime security, or indeed that might provide evidence of specific
criminal conduct, going beyond the original suspicions giving rise to a right
of boarding. I have argued elsewhere in this respect that “it is inconceivable

66. The following discussion draws on analysis in GUILFOYLE, supra note 56, at 327–28.
67. W ENDEL, supra note 65, at 51.
68. GUILFOYLE, supra note 56, at 244–45.
69. On the authority of a “presumptive flag State” verbally claimed by the master, see id. at
96, 340.
70. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 110(2).
71. Id. at 328. One would have to concede that the introduction of uniform IMO ship identification numbers in 1987 may have reduced the necessity for hold searches.
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that [Article 110] would prohibit a State from making use of knowledge of
other illicit activities discovered or alerting the vessel’s flag State of such.”72
Indeed, at least one treaty concerning maritime security, the 2005 Proto73
col to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 74 imposes such a duty on a boarding State
granted flag State permission to board and inspect a vessel at sea.
The Protocol details a range of terrorism offenses, suspicion of which
might justify boarding and inspection of a vessel. Generally such a boarding
by a “requesting party” may only follow a request for and receipt of flag State
consent, unless the flag State has waived that requirement under the treaty. 75
For VBSS operations the Protocol provides:
When evidence of conduct [prescribed under the Protocol] is found as the
result of any boarding . . . the flag State may authorize the requesting Party
to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag State. The requesting Party shall promptly
inform the flag State of the results of a boarding, search, and detention
conducted pursuant to this article. The requesting Party shall also promptly inform
the flag State of the discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that is not subject to this
Convention.76

Admittedly, other than this text there seems to be relatively little positive
law dealing with the question of whether wider use can be made of evidence
of other illegal conduct discovered aboard. One could attempt to invoke the
so-called Lotus presumption in support of the conclusion that wider use is
permitted in order to argue that anything not expressly prohibited is, in fact,
permitted. However, quite apart from the fact that current scholarship tends

72. Douglas Guilfoyle, Article 110, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA: A COMMENTARY 754 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017).
73. Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Nov. 1, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 [hereinafter SUA Protocol 2005].
74. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
75. See SUA Protocol 2005, supra note 73, art. 8bis(5)(d), (e) (setting out provisions for
deemed consent after the lapse of four hours from the request in certain circumstances or
complete waiver of the consent requirement).
76. Id. art. 8bis(6) (emphasis added).
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to argue that this is not, in fact, what the Lotus case stands for, 77 attempts to
argue in such terms usually end up in an unproductive cul-de-sac. The proposition, as usually stated, is too broad to be meaningfully applied and presumes international law to consist largely of prohibitions rather than positive
or facilitative rules. The better question is whether there any identifiable obligations of international law that would be breached if one were to make
wider use of information found during a VBSS operation. It is submitted
that such obligations are in practice rather hard to find. One could attempt
to argue that wider use of information discovered somehow violates the
principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, but one would have to
state the principle at a very high level of generality for that result to follow.
As this author has argued elsewhere, 78 the regulatory jurisdiction (i.e.,
prescriptive jurisdiction) is by no means completely exclusive and other
States remain free to attach consequences to the actions of, for example,
their nationals aboard foreign vessels on the high seas. At best, the principle
of “exclusive” flag State jurisdiction confers a prima facie immunity from
physical interference on the high seas (enforcement jurisdiction) subject to
exceptions provided by UNCLOS, other treaties or flag State consent. The
rule of exclusive flag State jurisdiction is thus heavily qualified, and is by its
very nature derogable. This does not seem compatible with the idea that it
contains by necessary inference an otherwise unstated blanket prohibition
against wider use of information discovered aboard a vessel on the high seas
subject to a legal VBSS operation. Indeed, one might argue that positive obligations upon States to cooperate to suppress various illicit activities at sea
mitigates in favor of the sharing of information where possible. Such obligations of cooperation exist with regard to, inter alia, piracy, 79 maritime drug
smuggling, 80 unauthorized high seas radio broadcasting, 81 the enforcement

77. See Hugh Handeyside, The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat?, 29
MICHIGAN J OURNAL OF I NTERNATIONAL LAW 71, 78–80 (2007); An Hertogen, Letting Lotus Bloom, 26 E UROPEAN J OURNAL OF I NTERNATIONAL LAW 901 (2015); Douglas Guilfoyle, SS Lotus, in LANDMARK CASES IN PUBLIC I NTERNATIONAL LAW (Cameron Miles &
Eirik Bjorge eds., forthcoming 2017); OLE SPIERMANN, I NTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT IN THE PERMANENT COURT OF I NTERNATIONAL J USTICE 254 (2005); see also id. at
106–07.
78. Guilfoyle, supra note 72; see also GUILFOYLE, supra note 56, at 101.
79. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 100.
80. Id. art. 108(1).
81. Id. art. 109(1).
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of internationally agreed fisheries conservation measures 82 and the prevention of migrant smuggling by sea. 83
B. VBSS in Waters under National Jurisdiction
There are numerous good studies of the practical limitations international
law may place upon VBSS operations in waters under national jurisdiction. 84
In the present article, the summary is not intended to be more than indicative
of these limitations. 85
The territorial sea of up to 12 nm is plainly a zone of sovereign jurisdiction over which coastal States have law enforcement jurisdiction, subject to
innocent passage. What this means in practice has been debated. Some see
innocent passage as conferring an absolute immunity from VBSS, unless
“non-innocence” is made out on one of the specified grounds. 86 Others have
long pointed to the ambiguity of UNCLOS and the Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea on this point. Both conventions proclaim that a coastal
State “should not” exercise criminal jurisdiction over “a foreign ship passing
through the territorial sea” unless one of the categories of non-innocent passage are made out. 87 However, should not is generally exhortatory language to
be contrasted with a mandatory shall not. Churchill and Lowe see the provision as codifying usage: coastal States ordinarily restricted any exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction within territorial waters to a limited and generally
82. Id. art. 20(1). See also Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for
signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3.
83. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 7, opened for signature
Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507.
84. See especially Kraska, supra note 59.
85. Ships bound inward to port pose few jurisdictional problems, as conditions of entry to
port may be imposed and enforced, including submitting to inspection or providing information ahead of arrival. This analysis concerns vessels that do not enter a port of the
coastal State.
86. Namely, under Article 21(1) of UNCLOS:
(a) [I]f the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if the crime is of a kind
to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship . . .; or (d) if . . .
necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 21(1).
87. Id., art. 27; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 19, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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accepted set of grounds. 88 Views differed as to whether that practice evidenced a restriction on powers of enforcement in the territorial sea (i.e., a
limitation upon sovereignty) or simply evidenced comity (i.e., plenary sovereignty, usually exercised with restraint). 89 The debate is far from resolved,
but the only clear prohibitions on law enforcement in the territorial sea concern sovereign immune vessels and crimes “committed before the ship entered the territorial sea” where the vessel in question is simply passing
through the territorial sea without entering internal waters. 90
Conversely, the extent of law enforcement power in the contiguous zone
may provide less authority than commonly thought to conduct VBSS operations. Within a contiguous zone (extending up to a further 12 nm seaward
from the territorial sea), “states have limited powers” under UNCLOS Article 33 to enforce “customs, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws.”91 UNCLOS allows coastal States only to exercise “control” (not sovereignty or
jurisdiction) either to prevent infringement of the specified laws within the
State’s territory or territorial sea or to punish acts already committed within
its territory or territorial sea. 92 Shearer argues that the connotations of control limit preventive enforcement action to “inspections and warnings,” rather than arresting vessels. 93 Some authorities, and in particular U.S. commentators, treat Article 33 as allowing plenary criminal law enforcement for
violations of the specified subject matters up to the outer limit of the zone. 94
This approach fails to give separate meanings to “prevent” and “punish.”
The power to “punish” is conditioned upon criminal acts having occurred
within a State’s territory or territorial sea. 95 By analogy with the doctrine of
hot pursuit, this appears to be an express extension of an otherwise impermissible jurisdiction. The condition limiting the exercise of jurisdiction to
88. R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 95–99 (3d ed. 1999).
89. Id.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 37, arts. 27(5), 30–33. On the challenge of sovereign immune
vessels that violate coastal State law in the territorial sea, see James Kraska, Putting Your Head
in the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters, 54 COLUMBIA J OURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 164 (2015).
91. Ivan Shearer, Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement against Delinquent Vessels, 35 I NTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 320, 330 (1986).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 30, 49 (AM. LAW I NST.
1987); J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO E XCESSIVE
MARITIME CLAIMS 481 (2d ed. 1996).
95. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 33(1)(b).
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“punish” would be redundant if relevant criminal laws were continuously
enforceable up to the outer limit of the zone. The claim, for example, that
“if the U.S. Intelligence Community levies terrorism threat reporting [i.e., the
vessel is allegedly carrying terrorism-related material or personnel] against a
ship anywhere within 24 nautical miles of the United States coast, it would
be subject to United States jurisdiction”96 is absurd unless the facts of the
case disclose a close link to a customs or immigration violation that has actually occurred. If such a violation is merely threatened, permissible measures
may be constrained to visit and inspection.
Finally, in the 200 nm EEZ, coastal States enjoy a limited bundle of sovereign rights and subject matter jurisdiction. They have “sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living . . . and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.”97 Under
this jurisdiction, the coastal State may also conduct activities pertaining to
“artificial islands, installations and structures,” marine scientific research and
“the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”98 In exercising
its sovereign rights the coastal State may “take such measures, including
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings” as are necessary to enforce its laws with respect to those rights. 99 Curiously, there are no express
enforcement provisions in UNCLOS regarding “artificial structures and marine scientific research,”100 but it is not questioned that, for example, a State’s
criminal law may in principle extend to vessels that violate laws applicable in
a safety zone around an artificial structure. 101 In protecting the marine environment, the coastal State enjoys power to regulate dumping under Article
211(5), to conduct boarding and inspection of vessels causing or threatening
“significant pollution of the marine environment” and to arrest and institute
proceedings against vessels in pollution incidents that on “clear objective
evidence” have caused “major damage or threat of major damage” under
Articles 220(5) and 220(6).102
96. Thomas M. Brown, For the “Round and Top of Sovereignty”: Boarding Foreign Vessels at Sea on
Terror-Related Intelligence Tips, 59 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 63, 77 (2010).
97. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 56(1)(a).
98. Id. art 56(1)(b).
99. Id. art. 73(1).
100. Shearer, supra note 91, at 335.
101. See, e.g., Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2014), http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/21.
102. Such jurisdiction being concurrent with that of the flag State. See also Shearer, supra note
91, at 335.
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As regards both the contiguous zone and EEZ, it would be an abuse of
right to use such a power of inspection intentionally to gain intelligence not
related to the subject matters over which rights or jurisdiction have been
granted to a coastal State; however, wider use of any information discovered
in the course of such a boarding should be permitted for the reasons discussed above in relation to the high seas. Thus, it is hard to see what significant restrictions international law might place upon the use a coastal State
could make of law enforcement intelligence gleaned through a lawful VBSS
operation in waters under national jurisdiction. One question might be
whether VBSS operations can be conducted in international straits subject
to the regime of transit passage, under which vessels enjoying such a right
“shall not be impeded.”103 There is, however, not space to consider this point
further in the present article. 104
V.

PRACTICAL MEASURES

What, practically speaking, follows from this analysis? Some observations are
straightforward. If the aim of many maritime security operations is a successful prosecution, then navies and other maritime security agencies must
be trained in more than basic boarding and inspection techniques. As Sonnenberg notes: “The ability to conduct inquiries, proper searches, and intelligence collection is just as important [as tactical techniques and procedures],
if not more so, because they are the core tasks of a boarding that will determine the outcome.”105 Indeed, one U.S. study has concluded that “the lack
of specialized training for VBSS missions is a major deficiency in maritime
security operations.”106 The mission needs to determine the capabilities that
are required, rather than agency capabilities driving the types of mission that
are undertaken. And, as Tomasulo notes, maritime threat response cases may
be “planned” or “unplanned.”
Planned responses originate as a result of actionable intelligence. A planned
response provides time for the various [stakeholder] U.S. Government
agencies . . . to deliberate and select the appropriate mix of resources to
achieve the desired outcome in response to a particular threat. The type of

103. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 38(1).
104. See Shearer, supra note 91, at 331–32, for a consideration of this issue.
105. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 71.
106. Id. at 71–72.
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capability employed is based on the level of the threat and the desired outcome.107

The threat that will be represented by “an armed terrorist on a vessel that is
expected to be non-compliant” may require Navy SEALs. 108 However, if the
desired outcome involves “criminal prosecution,” then coast guard specialized boarding teams will need to be involved. Some cases may require a mix
of capabilities.109 Thus, it is increasingly important for navies, as well as civilian maritime agencies, to have some appreciation of law enforcement skills,
to include minimal use of force in order to reduce disruption to society; the
knowledge and ability to conduct effective and legal searches, to piece together case packages and to understand the difference between evidence and
intelligence. 110
The issue becomes only more acute in multinational maritime security
operations, such as counter-narcotics and counter-piracy operations, where
the prosecuting State may not be the same entity as the boarding State. In
the counter-piracy context, it has been noted that “law enforcement agents
are generally trained to collect and preserve evidence in accordance with their
own criminal procedure requirements. But what is good evidence for a
Dutch court may not necessarily be good evidence for a Kenyan court.”111
Indeed, evidentiary issues can present challenges throughout multilateral
operations. For example, the value of otherwise actionable evidence may be
lost, not because it is somehow considered tainted, but, due to “the formal
requirements of admissibility” in a given legal system. 112 Thus, while Kenya
has been willing since 2006 to conduct numerous trials of Somali piracy suspects captured by foreign navies patrolling the Gulf of Aden, its courts faced
difficulties in accepting “the admissibility of photographs that were taken by
a person not previously authorised by the Attorney-General.”113 In the end,
international cooperation required “substantive changes in laws or policy”

107. Tomasulo, supra note 32, at 34.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 124.
111. Rob McLaughlin & Tamsin Phillipa Paige, The Role Of Information Sharing In CounterPiracy In The Horn Of Africa Region: A Model For Transnational Criminal Enforcement Operations,
12 J OURNAL OF I NTERNATIONAL LAW AND I NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 82, 92 (2016).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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by a number of States conducting either counter-piracy patrols or trials of
captured piracy suspects. 114
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article explored the question of intelligence collection and distribution
to support maritime law enforcement operations in the context of modern
concerns about maritime security more broadly. This line of inquiry required
consideration of intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing/coordinated
action in each of two dimensions. Relevant intelligence for law enforcement
may consist either of general awareness of the maritime domain or to specific
evidence supporting a criminal prosecution. That is, the deployment of finite
law enforcement assets requires knowledge of which vessels are engaged in
what activities, and where they are located. Regarding the second dimension
of law enforcement intelligence gathering, as navies are increasingly involved
in maritime security operations that may shade over into law enforcement,
greater training and coordination may be required such that naval personnel
can act to support law enforcement operations without compromising the
collection of admissible evidence.
This issue raises the question of coordinated action and sharing intelligence either between agencies or between governments. Irrespective of
which coastal State is being discussed, maritime security operations will require the coordination of a variety of government departments and agencies.
Thus, there will be significant questions of horizontal coordination within
any government conducting maritime security or law enforcement operations. Additionally, there may be significant questions of coordination between partner States engaged in suppression of such activities as drug smuggling or piracy.
A number of relevant legal questions arising have been considered. The
least legally complex question, though perhaps one of the more practically
complex, is the interface between partner States in handing over admissible
evidence packages from an interdicting or boarding State to prosecuting authorities in a different State. While a certain amount of practical training and
coordination may assist in such cases, in some there will simply be no alternative to revisions to domestic legislation if successful prosecutions are to
occur. Similar challenges may arise within a coastal State if navies become
involved in maritime law enforcement.
114. Id.
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A number of the legal difficulties in achieving maritime domain awareness have also been discussed. While the IMO’s LRIT regulation achieves a
greater degree of coordinated information sharing among flag States and
coastal States that could support the achievement of better MDA, significant
gaps in the LRIT regime remain, especially as regards small craft. Such gaps
may not be entirely possible to close at the level of national action either. As
with any intelligence exercise, while one can seek better information, perfect
information is simply not possible.
Finally, some attention has been given to the specific legal question of
what can be done with intelligence gathered in the course of a VBSS operation conducted for one purpose, but which results in evidence of an unrelated crime being uncovered. Can such evidence be retained and used for
other purposes by the boarding State or shared with other States, including
the flag State? I have referred to this as the question of “wider use.” Commentators tend to suggest that VBSS may only be conducted for quite limited
purposes, and the action taken must not exceed what the original suspicion
giving rise to the right of boarding would require. Even if one takes so narrow a view, the conclusion suggested here is that nothing in the law of the
sea prohibits wider use being made of evidence uncovered of crimes other
than that of which the vessel was originally suspected. Indeed, coming to a
contrary conclusion could undermine various duties upon States to cooperate in the suppression of maritime crime. The only relevant limitation would
be that deliberately boarding and searching a vessel under color of a suspicion not actually held with the purpose of gathering information about unrelated offenses would likely constitute an abuse of right.
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